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MIND THE GAP:
BASIC HEALTH ALONG THE
ACA’S COVERAGE CONTINUUM
SALLIE THIEME SANFORD∗
I. INTRODUCTION
It will not be easy to implement the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s)1
insurance access provisions, and implementation will not be a one-time event. The
ACA’s delayed Basic Health Program (BHP)2 underscores both of these points.
This insurance affordability program was intended to be available as a state option
in January 2014, in explicit coordination with an expanded Medicaid and the new
insurance exchange Marketplaces.3 The BHP is designed to be a separate program
that operates as a bridge between the two, with the goals of reducing insurance
costs and increasing care continuity for low-income people who are ineligible for
Medicaid and who would otherwise qualify for subsidized private insurance
coverage through the Marketplace.4
Because of federal regulatory delay, the program cannot start before 2015.5
For states considering the BHP, this delay complicates what was already a
Copyright © 2014 by Sallie Thieme Sanford.

* Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law, Adjunct Assistant Professor,
University of Washington Department of Health Services, sanfords@u.washington.edu. For their
helpful comments, I am grateful to the participants of the University of Maryland’s Health Care
Reform: The State of the States Roundtable. Jessica Belle, JD, and Rebecca Leah Levine, MPH,
JD, provided excellent research assistance.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
2. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 18051 (Supp. V
2012) (explaining basic health program option).
3. See Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 186,59122, 186,59127 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 600) (discussing BHP coordination with the Marketplace and
Medicaid). In the ACA the sites for purchasing individual private insurance plans are referred to
as “Exchanges,” but the federal government’s information website and other popular sources now
term them “Marketplaces.” See Health Insurance Marketplace for Individuals,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/marketplace/individual (last visited Oct.14, 2013)
(displaying the federal government website’s use of the term “Marketplace”).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 18051(a)(1)–(2) (Supp. V 2012). See also Basic Health Program, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 186,59123 (discussing the purpose of establishing a BHP).
5. See Questions and Answers: Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act, MEDICAID.GOV,
(Feb. 2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/state-resource-center/FAQ-medicaid-and-chip-affordable-
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complicated calculus, one with significant unknowns and moving parts. States with
related pre-existing programs will be challenged to maintain aspects of their
infrastructure while they consider the pros and cons of incorporating a delayed
BHP, or related, still evolving options.6 One upside of the delay is that states will
have preliminary data on the coverage status of those who would be served by the
program and also on the functioning of their Marketplaces,7 and expanded
Medicaid.8 States will have initial indications about whether and how the ACA’s
coverage incentives are working.9
A state’s decision whether to adopt the BHP will involve consideration of its
impacts on low-income residents, on the state Marketplace, and on the state
budget.10 These considerations do not involve merely technical or financial
issues.11 They raise fundamental health care access issues that animated the BHP’s
adoption—both as part of the ACA and in its historical form.12
In this article, I first describe the origins of the BHP in a state program with
parallels to the current federal reform effort.13 I then turn to the specifics of the

care-act-implementation/downloads/aca-faq-bhp.pdf (announcing that BHP regulations would be
delayed); see also Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,123 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 600) (specifying that states will have the option to establish a BHP
beginning Jan. 1, 2015).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(G) (Supp. V 2011) (explaining that there will be a periodic review
of the benefits offered by a state’s Marketplace). See Supporting Statement for Data Collection to
Support Eligibility Determinations for Insurance Affordability Programs and Enrollment through
Affordable Insurance Exchanges, Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program Agencies,
STATE
REFORUM,
https://www.statereforum.org/system/files/508cms-10440_supporting_
statement_part_a.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) (discussing the collection of data to determine
coverage status and enroll individuals in appropriate coverage programs). See Amanda Cassidy,
Health Policy Brief: Basic Health Program, HEALTH AFF. 1 (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_80.pdf (discussing the
establishment of a BHP as an additional means of expanding coverage after extending Medicaid
and private health insurance to qualified individuals).
8. See STATE REFORUM, supra note 7 (stating that data must be collected to determine how
individuals can apply for the ACA and which program is most appropriate); see also Cassidy,
supra note 7 (stating Medicaid is set to expand in January 2014).
9. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 18022 (Supp. V 2012)) (establishing a periodic review of the benefits offered by a state’s
marketplace).
10. See Deborah Bachrach et al., Focus on Health Reform—The Role of the Basic Health
Program in the Coverage Continuum: Opportunities, Risks, and Considerations for States,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 3, 3 (Mar. 2012), http://www.statecoverage.org/files/KFF-Role_of_BHP
_in_Coverage_Continuum-Manatt_3.2012.pdf (discussing the advantages and risks states should
consider when deciding whether or not to implement a BHP).
11. See id. at 5–8 (discussing the considerations of establishing a BHP).
12. See John A. Graves et al., Balancing Coverage Affordability and Continuity under a Basic
Health Program Option, NEW ENG. J. MED. e44(1), e44(1) (2011), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1111863 (discussing the ACA’s concern for
continuity of coverage and the option to adopt a BHP to address disruptions in coverage).
13. See infra Part II.
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ACA’s provision and its context within the law’s insurance affordability
programs.14 Finally, I consider possible questions that the program raises for
policymakers going forward.15 Can BHP coverage be designed to be increase
affordability and promote care continuity better than Marketplace coverage?
Would the existence of the BHP enhance or undermine the state’s Marketplace?16
How would the federal funding compare to the state’s costs for the program?17
Ultimately, whether a state adopts the BHP or not, it ought to mind the gap between
Medicaid and the Marketplace.18 When transitioning between the Medicaid and
Marketplace insurance platforms, people can stumble. In this transition, central
ACA goals of affordability and continuity will be tested.19
II. THE BASIC HEALTH PROGRAM’S PAST—ITS ROOTS IN
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM
The BHP was added to the ACA in Washington, D.C., but its roots lie in the
other Washington.20 Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Washington State legislature
undertook a concerted effort to reduce the number of uninsured Washingtonians,
then estimated at about 12% of the state’s population.21 Washington Basic Health
began as a pilot project in 1988 to offer state-subsidized private health insurance to
4,000 low-income residents of the state’s two most populous counties.22
The legislature reauthorized and expanded the project, and then included it as
a centerpiece of the state’s sweeping attempt at “ambitious, comprehensive health
reform[] in the early 1990s.”23 Washington State’s 1993 Health Services Act
(HSA)24 aimed at universal coverage, using mechanisms similar to those adopted

14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Parts III–IV; see also Graves et al., supra note 12, at e44(3) (discussing the
ACA’s goal of “ensuring access to stable and affordable coverage.”).
20. See History of Basic Health, WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH.,
http://www.basichealth.hca.wa.gov/about.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (discussing the origin
of Basic Health in Washington state).
21. Id.
22. See id. (discussing Washington Basic Health as a pilot program, as well as the state’s
establishment of a high-risk pool in efforts to reduce the number of uninsured Washingtonians);
Health Care Access Act of 1987, ch. 5, 1987 Wash. Sess. Laws 2502 (discussing the
establishment of basic health care services for Washingtonians).
23. See Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform in
Washington, Kentucky, and Massachusetts, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 133, 133-37 (2000).
See generally Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 2070,
2073, repealed by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973 (revealing the history
of the health care reform act in Washington).
24. Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 2070, repealed
by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973.
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nearly two decades later in the ACA.25 Washington’s HSA required most state
residents to have health insurance, and most employers to provide it.26 The HSA
included a phase-in of pure community rating on the individual market, ultimately
with no price variability for age, pre-existing condition or other factors.27
Washington Basic Health, which became permanent under the HSA,28 was a
significant piece of this attempt at universal coverage.29 Washington Basic Health
was to the state HSA somewhat as the health insurance Marketplaces are to the
federal ACA.30 Individuals and families without access to employer-sponsored
insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid, could turn to Washington Basic Health, a
marketplace of comparable private insurance plans offering at least the statutorily
required set of benefits, with sliding-scale state subsidies for those with incomes
below 200% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL).31 Those with incomes above
200% FPL were statutorily eligible to buy insurance on this marketplace, but
without state subsidies.32

25. Compare id. §§ 101–102 (discussing the essential services that will be offered to
Washingtonians that enroll in certified health plans), with Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act § 1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (Supp. V 2012) (discussing the essential health benefits that will
be offered to individuals enrolling in health plans).
26. See Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, §§ 463–464, 1993 Wash. Sess.
Laws 2070, repealed by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973 (discussing
state resident and employer participation in Washington’s HSA). Because Washington is one of
the few states without an income tax, the legislature could not rely on a tax penalty to enforce the
individual mandate, unlike the federal government in the ACA. See Income Tax, DEP’T OF
REVENUE WASH. STATE, http://dor.wa.gov/content/findtaxesandrates/incometax/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2013) (explaining that “Washington State does not have a personal or corporate income
tax.”). See What’s the Penalty for Not Having Health Insurance?, EHEALTH (June 26, 2013),
https://www.ehealthinsurance.com/affordable-care-act/faqs/how-much-are-the-tax-penalties-fornot-having-health-insurance-and-when-do-they-apply (discussing the ACA tax penalty and how it
is implemented). What was to be done about employers who were required to provide insurance
and did not or individuals who were required to have insurance and did not? The newly created
Washington Health Services Commission was to report back on the “reasons why individuals are
not enrolled . . . and [make] recommendations regarding enforcement of this requirement.”
Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, § 463, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 2070, repealed
by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973.
27. See Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, § 453, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws
2070, repealed by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973 (discussing the
HSA’s uniform and supplemental benefits package based on community rating).
28. See id. at 2075 (discussing the legislative findings on the importance of a Washington
Basic Health).
29. See id.
30. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
31. Washington Health Services Act of 1993, ch. 492, § 208, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 2070,
repealed by Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973.
32. See id. (discussing the enrollment of subsidized and nonsubsidized individuals). In the
recent decade, however, unsubsidized coverage under the program has been mostly unavailable as
insurance companies declined to participate in that portion of the market. See History of Basic
Health, supra note 20 (discussing a decline in nonsubsidized coverage as a result of rising costs).
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Before this comprehensive health reform statute went into effect, however,
the legislature gutted it.33 The legislature first repealed the contentious mandates
(to individuals and employers)34 and then, as insurers abandoned the individual
market, limited key consumer protections (including that people not be denied a
policy or charged more based on pre-existing conditions).35 Changing political
circumstances influenced this quick turnabout. Republicans gained control in the
state House and came within one seat in the Senate,36 while raising objections to
what they saw as government overreaching in the health care arena.37 In addition,
the federal government seemed unlikely to grant an ERISA waiver,38 which was
probably necessary to enforce the employer mandates.39 Furthermore, the Clinton
health plan,40 which had been under serious consideration in 1993, was effectively
dead when Washington’s newly realigned legislature opened its session.41
Washington Basic Health, however, remained. Several other states adopted
similar programs to cover low-income residents not eligible for Medicaid.42
33. See infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (tracing the evolution of Basic Health,
which was adopted under the ACA).
34. Act of May 8, 1995, ch. 265, 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws 973. See History of Basic Health,
supra note 20 (noting that HB 1046 repealed much of the HSA, “eliminating the minimum
benefits package and the employer/individual mandate”). See also Kirk, supra note 23, at 137–38
(stating that “[i]n addition to removing the employer provisions that ran afoul of ERISA, the
repeal had important implications for the individual market”).
35. See Act of March 23, 2000, ch. 79, 2000 Wash. Sess. Laws 413, 425 (regarding eligibility
for pool coverage for those who have been denied coverage, have had restrictive riders added to
their policy, or have up-rated premiums based on pre-existing conditions).
36. Kirk, supra note 23, at 137.
37. See Robert Cihak, et al., The Rise and Repeal of the Washington State Health
Plan: Lessons For America's State Legislators, Heritage Found. (June 11, 1997),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1997/06/bg1121nbsp-the-rise-and-repeal-of-thewashington (describing the “attempt to implement the Washington State plan produced a citizens'
revolt and led to a Republican takeover of the legislature” which “repealed the reform package”).
38. See Kirk, supra note 23, at 137 (explaining that “Washington’s ERISA waiver prospects
at the national level” appeared to diminish as of the fall of 1994).
39. See Kirk, supra note 23, at 138 (explaining that when the legislature passed legislation
repealing parts of the HSA, it also removed “the employer provisions that ran afoul of ERISA”).
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is a complicated federal statute that,
among many other things, “supersede[s] any and all state laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .” ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006);
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 197–98 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that ERISA
pre-empts Maryland employer-coverage requirement). See also Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v.
City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 661 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, 546 F.3d 639
(2008), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3497 (2010) (holding that ERISA does not pre-empt San Francisco
employer-coverage requirement).
40. See Kirk, supra note 23, at 137–38 (describing a coalition of business groups that ran
advertisements comparing Clinton’s “failed” health plan to the HSA).
41. See id. at 137–38 (noting that the “Clinton plan” did not pass).
42. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 16 (discussing pre-ACA state-funded programs for
coverage of low-income adults); see also Cassidy, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that, post-ACA,
Massachusetts and California passed initial legislation enabling a BHP, and “[s]even other states
have passed legislation requiring an analysis of the prospect”).
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MinnesotaCare, for example, is a prominent example, which provided subsidized
insurance to about 130,000 of that state’s working poor in 2012.43 At its height in
2002, Washington Basic Health insured more than 135,000 individuals.44 Under
Washington Basic Health, private insurers bid to provide coverage; in 2012, all
coverage was provided through managed care entities that also served the Medicaid
population.45 Coverage specifics have changed over time. In recent years, as the
program’s funding was cut, Washington Basic Health recipients have seen higher
out-of-pocket costs in the forms of deductibles, co-pays, and co-insurance.46
State budget constraints significantly limited the number of enrollees. In
2012, 35,000 individuals had Washington Basic Health coverage, and 166,000
more were on a waitlist.47 This is a fraction—though not an insignificant fraction—
of the one million state residents without any insurance in 2012.48 The percentage
of residents without health insurance at that point was a bit higher than when the
state piloted Washington Basic Health decades before.49 Leading up to 2014,
Washington Basic Health and other similar state programs received federal funds
under a Medicaid transitional bridge waiver,50 an explicit recognition that many of
those in the program would be eligible for Medicaid in 2014.
43. See MinnesotaCare, MINN. DEP’T. OF HUMAN SERVS., http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/
idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestRelease
d&dDocName=id_006255 (last visited June 25, 2013) (stating that “[t]he program served an
average of 129,000 people each month in state fiscal year 2012.”).
44. Washington State Proposal for a Federal Basic Health Option, WASH. STATE HEALTH
CARE AUTH. 1, 2 (2012), available at www.hca.wa.gov/hcr/me/documents/WA_State_BHPO_
Proposal_2012_06.pdf [hereinafter HCA Proposal]; see also More Washingtonians wait-listed for
Basic Health as employers cut coverage, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY INSTITUTE (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://www.eoionline.org/blog/more-washingtonians-wait-listed-for-basic-health-as-employerscut-coverage/ (stating that enrollment for Washington’s Basic Health was at “a high of 135,000 in
2002.”).
45. HCA Proposal, supra note 44, at 8 (describing how contracts were awarded to five
managed care organizations to offer coverage to enrollees of Medicaid and Washington Basic
Health whose coverage started on July 2012).
46. See History of Basic Health, supra note 20 (explaining that the average co-insurance and
co-pays for enrollees increased from the 2009 average of $34 per month to $60 per month in 2010,
and that the annual deductible increased from $150 to $250 in 2010).
47. See HCA Proposal, supra note 44, at 2 (explaining the waitlist as a result of an enrollment
freeze caused by budget cuts).
48. Mike Kreidler, State of the Uninsured Health Coverage in Washington State Costs,
Trends and Projections 2008 to 2014, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R 1, 1 (Dec. 13,
2011), http://www.insurance.wa.gov/about-oic/commissioner-reports/documents/2011-uninsuredreport.pdf (stating that “[r]oughly 1 million Washingtonians—14.5 percent—now have no health
insurance” going into 2012).
49. Compare History of Basic Health, supra note 20 (estimating that 12% to 14% of
Washington residents were uninsured in 1986 when Washington Basic Health was piloted) with
Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2013),
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/ (estimating the current percentage of
uninsured Washington residents at 14%).
50. See History of Basic Health, supra note 20 (explaining that the waiver provided an
estimated $7.7 million per month in federal funds in 2011, covering about 40% of the cost of
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III. THE BASIC HEALTH PROGRAM’S PRESENT—AN
ACA PROVISION WITH KEY UNKNOWNS
Citing her state’s experience, United States Senator Maria Cantwell of
Washington successfully offered the BHP option as an amendment to legislation
that became the ACA.51 Within the ACA, the BHP is located at 42 U.S.C. §
18051.52 Section 18051 falls, actually and symbolically, between the ACA
provisions for the new Marketplaces53 and expanded Medicaid.54 The BHP is
indelibly intertwined with these two key access provisions.
As drafted, the ACA presumed that in January 2014 all states would expand
their Medicaid populations, but the Supreme Court’s June 2012 decision makes this
a state option.55 In states that take this option—the “expansion states”—Medicaid
programs would be expanded to cover all citizens and immigrants with five years’
legal residency who are under age sixty-five and have incomes under 138% FPL.56
Because Medicaid otherwise targets categories of low-income people (primarily
those over sixty-five or with qualifying disabilities, children, and pregnant women)
this expansion effectively means Medicaid eligibility for many more low-income
working adults, who would not otherwise be eligible no matter how low their

Washington Basic Health and Disability Lifeline, a separate state program for uninsured people
with qualifying disabilities).
51. See Press Release, Senator Maria Cantwell, Health Care Reform Bill Includes Major
Cantwell Initiatives to Control Costs, Improve Quality of Care (Oct. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=318903 (stating that “the [Senate Finance]
Committee approved a Cantwell amendment that would establish a nation-wide version of
Washington state’s Basic Health system”).
52. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18051 (Supp. V 2012).
53. See id. § 18051(a)(1) (offering through Basic Health at least the “essential health benefits”
in 18022(b) “in lieu of offering such individuals coverage through an Exchange”); see also id. §
18031(a)(1) (establishing the Marketplaces).
54. See 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. V 2012) (expanding Medicaid to
individuals under sixty-five years old who are not pregnant, but whose incomes do not exceed
133% of the poverty line).
55. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (holding that
Medicaid expansion “is unconstitutional when applied to withdraw existing Medicaid funds from
States that decline to comply with the expansion”); see also Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into
Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 87 (2013) (criticizing the Medicaid ruling for “missteps” that resulted
from “factual inaccuracies promulgated by the Court”).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (Supp. V 2012); see also Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2008) (stating “an alien who is a
qualified alien . . . is not eligible for any Federal means-tested public benefit for a period of 5
years beginning on the date of the alien's entry into the United States with a status within the
meaning of the term ‘qualified alien’”). The ACA expansion threshold is 133% FPL, but the
statute specifies that 5% of an individual’s income is to be disregarded, effectively raising it to
138% FPL. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14)(I) (Supp. V 2012).
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income.57 Just how many more depends significantly on how many states, and
which states, expand their programs.
The Marketplaces are the other primary means that the ACA aims to
significantly increase the number of people with health insurance coverage.58 The
Marketplaces will offer private insurance plans—known as “qualified health plans”
(QHPs)—that provide at least the “essential health benefits,” and meet other
criteria.59 Plans will be offered at four “metal levels”—bronze, silver, gold and
platinum—with progressively higher actuarial values such that bronze plans would
have the lowest premiums but correspondingly higher expected out-of-pocket costs
(up to the standard out-of-pocket limit).60
A crucial aspect of these Marketplaces (and a large part of the cost to the
federal government) is their function as a vehicle for federal advance premium tax
credits to support insurance purchase.61 These tax credits are effectively subsidies
that are available to citizens and people with at least five years’ legal residency in
the United States who are not eligible for Medicaid, do not have adequate,
affordable employer-sponsored insurance, and have incomes that are between
100%62 and 400% FPL.63 These sliding scale subsidies are pegged to the premium

57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(10)(A) (granting “medical assistance” in the form of payment
of part or all of the costs for medical care and services for those over sixty-five or with qualifying
disabilities, children, and pregnant women); see also Medicaid and the Uninsured, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. 1, 1 (Mar. 2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2013/04/7993-03.pdf (stating that prior to the ACA, state Medicaid programs could only cover
non-disabled adults without dependent children by obtaining a waiver or through the state’s own
funding because federal Medicaid matching funds were not available to states covering that
population of adults ).
58. See Explaining Health Care Reform: Questions About Health Insurance Exchanges,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 2010), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/
7908-02.pdf (explaining that the purpose of the Marketplaces is to make the purchase of health
insurance easier and more affordable for individuals and small businesses that do not have access
to employer or public health coverage).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1) (defining “qualified health plan”); id. § 18022(b) (listing the
minimum benefits, general categories, items, and services covered under the “essential health
benefits package”).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d) (setting out the bronze, silver, gold and platinum levels of
coverage with the percentage of actuarial values).
61. See I.R.C. § 36B(a) (Supp. V 2012) (stating that “there shall be allowed as a credit against
the tax imposed by this subtitle for any taxable year an amount equal to the premium assistance
credit amount of the taxpayer for the taxable year”).
62. See Dylan Scott, The Story Behind the Biggest Mistake in Obamacare, GOVERNING
FEDWATCH (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.governing.com/blogs/fedwatch/gov-obamacaremistake.html (arguing that the fact that the subsidy eligibility begins at 100% FPL rather than at
138% FPL (the Medicaid expansion level) may simply be a drafting error). If it is a drafting error,
it is one that would have been of limited consequence but for the Supreme Court’s decision. Id.
Those who are Medicaid eligible are ineligible for subsidies; thus the subsidies effectively begin
at 138% FPL in expansion states. Id. That subsidies begin instead at 100% FPL in non-expansion
states has at least a couple of consequences. One is that federal costs for subsidies might be
higher (though offset by reduced federal Medicaid costs). Another is the possibility of a Medicaid
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price of the second least expensive silver plan.64 Cost-sharing subsidies (to reduce
the financial burden of deductibles, co-pays, and co-insurance) are also available to
purchasers with incomes between 100% and 250% FPL.65 Subsidies are not
available to those with incomes below 100% FPL.66 In a non-expansion state, then,
many low-income, non-disabled, non-pregnant adult citizens will be ineligible for
Medicaid and also ineligible for subsidized private insurance.67
The BHP would operate as a separate state-run program between the
subsidized Marketplace and expanded Medicaid.68 It is intended to be another of
the “insurance affordability programs,” in common with these two and the Child
Health Insurance Program.69

“premium assistance” or “private option” arrangement as discussed infra text accompanying note
71. Id.
63. See id. (stating that those with an income between 100–400% of the FPL qualify for
federal tax subsidies under this law).
64. See I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2) (explaining that premium assistance may be the excess of “the
adjusted monthly premium for such month for the applicable second lowest cost silver plan”).
65. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(2) (Supp. V 2012)
(stating the income levels for reduced cost sharing under the plan).
66. See id. at § 18071(c)(1)(A) (listing all income levels that qualify for cost sharing
subsidies, which are all above the 100% FPL).
67. See The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1, 7 (Oct. 2012), available at http://theadvocate.com/csp/mediapool/
sites/dt.common.streams.StreamServer.cls?STREAMOID=bK8_JxfGnfcXzTSDxu0$JZM5tm0Zx
rvol3sywaAHBAkhdfIFiD9VMoMYJ7v66u_FE0$uXvBjavsllACLNr6VhLEUIm2tympBeeq1Fw
i7sIigrCfKm_F3DhYfWov3omce$8CAqP1xDAFoSAgEcS6kSQ-&CONTENTTYPE=application/pdf&CONTENTDISPOSITION=Kaiser%20Commission%20Co
verage%20Gap%20October%202013.pdf [hereinafter The Coverage Gap] (stating that many
states opting out of Medicaid expansion leave millions of low-income adults uninsured because
they “will remain outside the reach of the ACA,” do not have employer-sponsored coverage, are
not eligible for state-assisted coverage, and even those eligible to purchase coverage on the
Marketplaces may be ineligible for the premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies”—thus the
insurance premium costs for low-income people in the coverage gap are “likely prohibitively
expensive”).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 18051(a)(1)–(e)(1)(A) (stating that a BHP may be established to provide
health benefits “to eligible individuals” in lieu of offering such individuals coverage through an
Exchange,” and an eligible individual “is not eligible to enroll in the State’s [M]edicaid
program”).
69. See id. § 18051 (Supp. V 2012) (giving states “flexibility to establish basic health
programs for low-income individuals not eligible for [M]edicaid”). CHIP has for many years
allowed states to cover with enhanced matching federal dollars children and some parents in
households with incomes above traditional Medicaid limits. See State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP): Reauthorization History, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 2009),
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7743-02.pdf (stating that CHIP was
enacted in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 to expand eligibility levels and simplify enrollment
procedures). See generally CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397ee(b)–ll (Supp.
V 2012).
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One of the BHP’s goals is to address issues of affordability.70 An
“affordability cliff” will exist between Medicaid, which has few out-of-pocket
costs, and the Marketplace, in which people just over the Medicaid cut-off will
have higher cost-sharing and also may pay premiums that, after subsidies, can
amount to as much as 3% of their income71—a relatively high amount for lowincome individuals and families. This is a highly price-sensitive population with
high rates of uninsurance.72 Low-income people, particularly healthy low-income
people, might find even the subsidized rates too high, and thus decline coverage.73
Another goal is to reduce churn and its impacts.74 “Churn” is shorthand for
continuity of care and administrative disruptions that arise when people transition
back and forth between insurance platforms as their income or family composition
changes.75 Income fluctuations are common among those with low-wage jobs, and
private insurance often comes with different physician and clinic networks than
does Medicaid.76
The BHP allows states to use federal funds to craft a separate, state-run
program of private insurance for residents with incomes below 200% FPL who are
ineligible for Medicaid and who would otherwise qualify for subsidized coverage
through the Marketplace.77 The state would contract with one or more managed
care plans to offer BHP coverage.78 The amount of federal funds provided to the
70. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 17 (stating that the overall intent of the BHP is to be
more affordable to consumers).
71. See Ann Hwang et al., Creation of State Basic Health Programs Would Lead to 4 Percent
Fewer People Churning Between Medicaid and Exchanges, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1314, 1314 (2012),
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/6/1314.full.html (explaining that “a high
proportion of people with low incomes will experience frequent shifts in eligibility between
Medicaid and state insurance exchanges”); see also Subsidy Calculator Premium Assistance for
Coverage in Exchanges, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 2013), available at
http://kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/#state=&zip=&income-type=dollars&income=33000
&employer-coverage=0&people=4&alternate-plan-family=individual&adult-count=2&adults%
5B0%5D%5Bage%5D=21&adults%5B0%5D%5Btobacco%5D=0&adults%5B1%5D%5Bage%5
D=21&adults%5B1%5D%5Btobacco%5D=0&child-count=2&child-tobacco=0 (estimating that
Marketplace premiums for those just over the 138% Medicaid cut-off can amount to up to 3.35%
of their income).
72. See Hwang et al., supra note 71, at 1314–18 (stating that affordability of coverage to
enrollees in the Marketplace may be affected by “a disrupted source of financial subsidy, [which]
may lead to breaks in coverage” and when “recouping tax credit overpayments, [which] might
occur if people receiving coverage through an exchange experience a rise in income during the
course of the year, because they will then be required to repay any excess tax credits that they
received”).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,140 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R pt. 600) (discussing the issue of churn).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18051(e) (Supp. V 2012)
(defining “eligible individual”).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 18051(a)(1) (Supp. V 2012).
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state for the BHP would be tied to subsidies the federal government would have
spent on the covered population had it remained in the Marketplace.79
Thus, the amount of funding for the program is quite linked to the premiums
and cost sharing associated with plans on the Marketplaces. States that choose this
option are to receive 95% of what the federal government would have spent on
premium subsidies,80 and 95% or 100% (the ACA is not entirely clear) of what the
federal government would have spent on cost-sharing subsidies.81 There are
significant financial calculation questions not addressed in the statute that will
presumably be clarified in the delayed BHP regulations. These relate to details
such as risk adjustments, financial support for program administration costs, and
the logistics of end-of-year reconciliation.82
The federal funds are to be used to “reduce the premiums and cost-sharing of
or to provide additional benefits to” BHP enrollees.83 If the state has a BHP,
people who are eligible for it would not be allowed to purchase subsidized
Marketplace insurance.84 They would instead be eligible for the BHP.85 BHP
benefits must be at least as comprehensive as those required to be offered on the
Marketplace.86 The ACA specifies that the BHP is to be coordinated with
Medicaid and other state-administered health programs “to maximize the efficiency
of such programs and to improve the continuity of care.”87 The expectation is that
the state would craft coverage that adopts benefit design and other system features
similar to that provided in the state’s Medicaid managed care program, thus
reducing the impact of churn around the 138% FPL income level.88
If an expansion state adopts the BHP, that program becomes a key part of the
coverage continuum for those without employer-provided insurance or Medicare.89
It would have a particularly prominent role for adult citizens: those below 138%
FPL would be covered by Medicaid;90 then up until 200% FPL by the BHP;91 from

79. Id. at § 18051(d)(3)(A)(i).
80. Id.
81. See infra note 160.
82. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 1 (discussing “significant questions and challenges”
involved with the implementation of the BHP).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 18051(d)(2) (Supp. V 2012).
84. Id. at § 18051(e)(2).
85. Id.
86. Id. at § 18051(a)(2)(B).
87. Id. at § 18051(c)(4).
88. See Cassidy, supra note 7, at 2–3 (discussing the BHP’s ability to eliminate churning
between Medicaid and Marketplace plans “for those below 200 percent of the poverty” level).
89. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 3–4 (discussing the continuum of coverage and
benefits of the BHP for those who do not have employer provided insurance or qualify for
Medicaid).
90. See Subsidy Calculator, supra note 71 (noting that “states have the option to expand
Medicaid eligibility to all people with incomes below 138% of the poverty level.”).
91. Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 3
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that level to 400% FPL by Marketplace insurance with sliding-scale federal
subsidies;92 and at higher incomes by Marketplace insurance without subsidies.93
Particularly in light of this coverage continuum, impacts of the BHP cannot be
considered in isolation.
Key issues and options are discussed in more detail in the following section of
this article.94 Suffice it to say here that interested states would have a very difficult
time deciding whether to incorporate the BHP into their Marketplace modeling
without knowing how the program would be regulated and funded. Washington
State expressed strong interest in transitioning its state Basic Health program to an
ACA-authorized BHP, formally requested federal guidance in early 2012, and
submitted a proposed framework in June 2012.95 Several other states, notably
including Minnesota, California, and Massachusetts also actively considered
adopting the BHP, pending federal guidance.96
On February 6, 2013, the Administration issued “sub-regulatory guidance”97
announcing that the program’s rollout would be delayed until 2015.98 This
document, technically a “Frequently Asked Questions” missive, promised that the
proposed rules would issue in 2013, with final rules to follow in 2014 “so that the
program will be operational beginning in 2015 for states interested in pursuing this

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See infra Part IV.
95. See generally Washington State Health Care Authority, Washington State Proposal for a
Federal Basic Health Option (June 18, 2012), http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/HRI/
Documents/July%202012/BHPO%20Proposal%20June%2018.pdf (explaining a proposed
framework to establish a BHP and seeking federal guidance).
96. See Cassidy, supra note 7, at 6 (stating that “Washington, Massachusetts and California
are taking steps to implement a Basic Health Program” while others are awaiting federal
clarifications on “specific details of the program.”); see also Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 3
n.1 (“At the time of this writing, analyses of BHP have been published for the following states:
California (two studies), Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North
Carolina, and Tennessee.”). Other states involved in 2013 BHP learning collaborative included
Oregon, New York, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia. See MEDICAID AND CHIP MAC
LEARNING COLLABORATIVES, BHP ELIGIBILITY AND ENROLLMENT LEARNING COLLABORATIVE
(PowerPoint Slides from virtual meeting May 6, 2012) (on file with the author).
97. Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: The Basic Health Program and Federal
Medicaid
Matching
Rates,
HEALTH
AFF.
BLOG
(Feb.
7,
2013),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/02/07/implementing-health-reform-the-basic-health-programand-federal-medicaid-matching-rates/ (discussing the HHS submission of two subregulatory
guidance documents: 1) “Notice to Establish a New System Records” and, 2) “Questions and
Answers: Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act”); see also Mary Whisner, Some Guidance About
Federal Agencies and Guidance, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 385, 392 (2013) (discussing sub-regulatory
guidance as a tool of administrative law).
98. Medicaid and CHIP FAQs: The Basic Health Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/State-Resource-Center/FAQ-Medicaidand-CHIP-Affordable-Care-Act-Implementation/Downloads/FAQs-by-Topic-BHP.pdf
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option.”99 During a February 14, 2013 Senate hearing, Senator Cantwell criticized
the Administration for failing to issue timely regulations and for thus in effect
“taking pages out of the law.”100 Proposed rules published on September 25, 2013
reiterate that interested states may establish a BHP effective January 1, 2015.101
The BHP has certainly suffered from the increasing complexity of ACA
implementation. State-level opposition to the ACA has made an already complex
endeavor much more so.102 Many states will not expand Medicaid in 2014, and this
includes states with a high percentage of citizens below 138% FPL.103 More than
thirty states will not run their own Marketplaces in 2014 but will instead default to
federal operation or a partnership model, a situation the statute and its funding do
not smoothly accommodate.104 At the federal level, the continued drumbeat for
repeal105 hinders attempts at even technical corrections, much less statutory
refinements, or appropriation amendments.106

99. Id.; see also Phil Galewitz, HHS Delays Basic Health Plan Option Until 2015, THE
KAISER HEALTH NEWS BLOG (Feb. 7, 2013), http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/?p=16689
(discussing the delay of the Basic Health Plan Option until 2015).
100. Phil Galewitz, Valentine’s Day Surprise: Senate Democrats Blast Obamacare
Implementation, THE KAISER HEALTH NEWS BLOG (Feb. 14, 2013), http://capsules.
kaiserhealthnews.org/?p=16879 (quoting Sens. Maria Cantwell, criticizing the administration for
failing to meet a 2014 deadline to start a BHP, “[y]ou are overwhelmed by the details and
technology, I get that point. . . . It seems as if the agency is taking pages out of the law.”).
101. Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,123 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 600).
102. See Michael Cannon, The Obstacle is That Americans Don’t Want It, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/29/is-obamacare-too-complicated-tosucceed/americans-dont-want-obamacare.
103. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, as of September 20, 2013,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expandingmedicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/#map (last visited July 1, 2013) (listing state decisions in
expanding Medicaid and running their Marketplaces).
104. See State Decisions for Creating Health Insurance Exchanges, as of May 28, 2013,
KAISER
FAMILY
FOUND.,
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-insuranceexchanges/#map (last visited July 1, 2013) (listing state decisions in creating health insurance
exchanges). Oklahoma brought one of several lawsuits challenging the authority of the federal
government to provide subsidies as to insurance purchased through federally run Marketplaces.
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. CIV–11–30–
RAW, 2013 WL 405610, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 2012). Among other complications, funds
for outreach to explain this new insurance purchasing arrangement were significantly linked to
funding for state establishment of its marketplace, and Health and Human Services Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius faced congressional questioning about solicitation of private funds to inform
people about the Marketplaces. See Robert Pear, Cabinet Secretary Solicits Large Donations to
Publicize Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/us/
politics/health-secretary-raises-funds-for-health-care-law.html (discussing Sebelius’ fundraising
efforts to “ensure the success of President Obama’s health care law” and questions from the
Senate health committee regarding the legality of these efforts).
105. See Robert Pear, House Votes to Delay Two Requirements of the Health Care Overhaul,
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/us/politics/house-votes-to-delaytwo-requirements-of-health-care-overhaul.html?_r=0 (noting that “[s]ince early 2011, the House

	
  

114	
  

	
  

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY	
  

[VOL. 17:	
  

Citing the complexity of the implementation challenges, the Obama
Administration delayed enforcement of the employer mandate until 2015107 and
delayed adoption of some features of the small business insurance Marketplaces.108
In addition, the Administration issued a torrent of ACA regulations on all manner
of ACA provisions besides those relating to insurance access.109 Members of
Congress expressed concern that Marketplace and Medicaid rollouts will lead to a
“train wreck.”110
Amidst all these implementation challenges, regulatory
obligations, and political realities there seems now to be a focus on “getting the
lights on,” on getting the essential aspects of the Marketplaces and expanded
Medicaid up and running.111 Left to a later day are less essential provisions and
potential refinements, including the BHP.112

has voted more than 35 times to repeal all or part of the law, to scale it back, or to cut financing
for its operation.”).
106. See Jonathan Weisman & Robert Pear, Partisan Gridlock Thwarts Effort to Alter Health
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/27/us/politics/polarizedcongress-thwarts-changes-to-health-care-law.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the lack of needed
changes to the ACA due to a “polarized Congress.”).
107. Mark J. Mazur, Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful, Thoughtful Manner, U.S.
DEP’T OF TREASURY (July 2, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/pages/continuing-toimplement-the-aca-in-a-careful-thoughtful-manner-.aspx (reporting that “[t]he Administration is
announcing that it will provide an additional year before the ACA mandatory employer and
insurer reporting requirements begin.”).
108. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and
Qualified Health Plans; Small Business Health Options Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 15,553, 15,554
(proposed Mar. 11, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155–156) (stating the purpose of
proposed rule was to provide additional time for small business owners to prepare for employee
choice model and increase stability of small group market).
109. See Major ACA Regulations Issued by Agencies, ANCOR (Mar. 5, 2013),
http://www.ancor.org/newsroom/news/major-aca-regulations-issued-agencies (stating that on
Friday, March 1, 2013 alone, five regulation were issued by government agencies regarding ACA
provisions).
110. See Robert Pear, Democratic Senators Tell White House of Concerns About Health Care
Law Rollout, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/us/politics/
democratic-senators-tell-white-house-of-concerns-about-health-care-law-rollout.html
(quoting
Senator Max Baucas, Democrat of Montana and chairman of the Finance Committee about
concerns of White House rollout of health care law, “I just see a huge train wreck coming down”).
111. See Jeffrey Young, Obamacare Health Insurance Exchanges will be Open On Time:
Official, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2013,), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/24/
obamacare-exchanges_n_3984375.html (stating that the Marketplaces were cornerstone of
President Obama’s health care reform law, and that the administration never wavered from the
October 1, 2013 implementation date); see also Jeffrey Young, Medicaid Expansion: States Must
Meet Obamacare Standards if They Want to Get Full Federal Funding, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec.
10,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/10/medicaid-expansion-obamacare_n_
2272151.html (stating the Obama administration’s decision that states must meet full Medicaid
expansion criteria before being eligible to receive full ACA funding).
112. See Galewitz, supra note 99 (stating the Obama administration has delayed the rollout of
the BHP because “it basically ran out of time to put out guidelines to get the program running by
2014” and that Health and Human Services will work to have the program available by 2015).
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IV. THE FUTURE OF BASIC HEALTH COVERAGE—QUESTIONS AND OPTIONS
In deciding whether to incorporate the delayed BHP or a related option into
the state insurance coverage continuum in the coming years, states face several
challenging questions. BHP regulations will shape their analyses but are unlikely
to provide definitive answers. That is because the answers, definitive and not, are
quite tied to the functioning of Medicaid and the Marketplace, and to the
characteristics of those who might fall into a coverage gap between the two.113 A
March 2012 report by the Kaiser Family Foundation114 and a November 2012
Health Policy Brief published in Health Affairs,115 among other resources, provide
overviews of key considerations in any state. In addition, there are several reports
that analyze the particulars as to specific states.116 The following highlights a few
of the key questions, particularly in light of the regulatory delay, and of evolving
options.
A.

Can a BHP be Designed to Make Coverage More Affordable
and Enhance Continuity of Coverage?

The potential to make coverage more affordable for low-income people drives
much of the interest in the BHP:117
Populations at the low end of the [Marketplace subsidy] scale face
what has been described as an affordability cliff: while those with
incomes under 139% FPL have no or minimal premium or costsharing obligations under Medicaid, those with incomes just above
139% FPL will be obligated to contribute approximately 3.3% of their
113. See Analysis of the Basic Health Program, MD. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND MENTAL
HYGIENE 9 (Jan. 17, 2012), http://dhmh.maryland.gov/docs/BHP%2001%2018%2012%20Report
%20Analysis%20FINAL.pdf (reporting a primary policy justification for BHPs is reducing
number of individuals forced to enroll in different insurance plans as they move between
Medicaid and Marketplace plans). Furthermore, the analysis reports the lack of provider and
benefit continuity for transitioning between Medicaid and Marketplace plans prompted the review
of the BHP. Id.
114. Bachrach et al., supra note 10.
115. Cassidy, supra note 7, at 4–6.
116. See, e.g., Matthew Buettgens & Caitlin Carroll, The ACA Basic Health Program in
Washington State, URBAN INST. (Aug. 2012), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412572-TheACA-Basic-Health-Program-in-Washington-State.pdf (reporting the financial and enrollment
estimates of a BHP in Washington State ); see also Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 3 (noting the
number of states that have conducted a state-specific BHP study).
117. See Rosemarie Day et al., Reform Center Health Intelligence: The Basic Health Plan—An
Emerging Option for States, MCKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM 1 (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://healthreform.mckinsey.com/~/media/Extranets/Health%20System%20Reform/Intels/Health
%20Intel%20Basic%20Health%20Plan_032411.ashx (reporting that many states are likely to give
the BHP consideration because it offers a more affordable alternative for providing health care to
individuals with low incomes, and would allow states to provide coverage for individuals between
138% and 200% of the FPL).
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income, or about $45 per month for subsidized coverage through the
[Marketplace], not including additional out-of-pocket costs that could
run as high as $174 per month.118
The premise behind the program is that with the state as an active purchaser,
premiums and cost-sharing would be reduced and/or benefits increased as required
by the provision.119
In addition, unlike people in Marketplace plans, people in a BHP would not
face the financial risk of owing the federal government subsidy money if their
incomes went up and a year-end reconciliation showed that they received too much
in health insurance subsidies.120 It is possible, though, that a state might be able to
design its BHP to impose some kind of financial recoupment for people whose
incomes rise while in the program. Lower out-of-pocket expenses and freedom
from the possibility of end-of-year reconciliation obligations should make BHP
coverage more affordable than Marketplace coverage and thus encourage eligible
people to enroll, though of course this depends somewhat on where the
Marketplace rates settle.121
B.

Can a BHP Reduce Churn?

Reducing churn and its associated problems are other key goals of the BHP
option.122 Wage fluctuations and shifts in family composition can cause a family,

118. Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 5.
119. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18051(c)(1) (Supp. V 2012)
(stating States shall establish competitive processes, to include negotiations of cost-sharing and
premiums, as well as, the negotiation of any benefits additional to the basic health benefits
described in § 18022(b), for contracting with standard health plans); see also Premium and CostSharing Subsidies in the Affordable Care Act, CMTY. CATALYST 1 (Sept. 2010),
http://www.communitycatalyst.org/doc_store/publications/Affordability_in_ACA.pdf
(stating
premium tax credits available through the ACA will lower the cost of premiums and cost-sharing
costs).
120. Basic Health Program Report, INS. DIV. DEP’T OF COM. AND CONSUMER AFF. ST. OF
HAW. 5 (Feb. 2013), http://hawaii.gov/dcca/ins/reports/Basic_Health_Program_Final_Report.pdf
(stating that in a BHP there is no risk of enrollees owing money back to the government due to
differences between beginning of the year estimations and enrollees actual incomes at the end of
the year); see also Julia James, Health Policy Brief: Premium Tax Credits, HEALTH AFF. 3 (Aug.
1, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_97.pdf (stating
that in a marketplace subsidy plan, if an income changes from what was used for estimation, the
amount difference will either be refunded or owed to the government).
121. See Basic Health Plan Could Provide Nearly Half a Million New Yorkers with More
Affordable Insurance, N.Y. ST. HEALTH FOUND. (June 30, 2011), http://nyshealthfoundation.org/
news-events/news/basic-health-plan-could-provide-nearly-half-a-million-new-yorkers-with-more
(discussing possible cost impacts on individuals of a BHP compared to Marketplace plans).
122. See Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,140 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 600) (discussing income variability that “can result in individuals
moving back and forth between Medicaid and an Exchange, a phenomenon known as ‘churning’”,
and how the BHP could reduce churn).
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or members of a family, to move back and forth between coverage within
Medicaid, the BHP if it exists, and the Marketplace.123 Transitioning from one type
of coverage to another can be disruptive, sometimes forcing people to change
physicians, clinics, or medications, and thus leading to gaps in coverage.124 “It has
been estimated that, once coverage is expanded in 2014, within six months of
enrollment, more than one-third of all low-income adults—about 28 million
people—may experience enough of a change in income to churn between Medicaid
and [the Marketplace].”125
If the BHP is structured similarly to Medicaid plans, with similar provider
networks and other design features, churn should decrease at the 138% FPL
level.126 The ACA specifically requires coordinating the BHP with Medicaid and
other state-administered health programs.127 For reasons of continuity as well as
cost, states are likely to look to existing Medicaid managed care plans.128 That then
raises a related concern about the rates to be offered to health care providers. If
they are closer to Medicaid rates than private insurance rates, that fact might
dissuade providers from signing up, limiting networks and making the plans less
desirable.129
It is possible that a BHP could increase overall churn, though perhaps without
as significant deleterious effects as would exist without the BHP. Increased overall

123. See Matthew Buettgens et al., Churning Under the ACA and the State Policy Options for
Mitigation: Timely Analysis of Intermediate Health Policy Issue, URBAN INST. 7 (June 2012),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412587-Churning-Under-the-ACA-and-State-PolicyOptions-for-Mitigation.pdf (reporting that many individuals move in and out of Medicaid and
across coverage plans due to fluctuations in their hours or wages); Cassidy, supra note 7, at 2
(stating that family size changes through the birth of a child may change the family’s relation to
the poverty level, and further lead the family to moving to a different type of insurance coverage,
or gaining or losing federal subsidies).
124. Cassidy, supra note 7, at 2.
125. Id.
126. See John A. Graves et al., Balancing Coverage Affordability and Continuity under a Basic
Health Program Option, 365 NEW ENGL. J. MED. e44(1), e44(3) (2011) (stating that the BHP
would reduce churn at the 138% FPL level).
127. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18051(c)(4) (Supp. V 2012)
(stating that “[a] State shall seek to coordinate the administration of, and provision of benefits
under, its program under this section with the State Medicaid program under title XIX of the
Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.], the State child health plan under title XXI of such
Act [42 U.S.C. 1397aa et seq.], and other State-administered health programs to maximize the
efficiency of such programs and to improve the continuity of care.”).
128. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 6 (stating that states are likely to look at Medicaid
managed care plans as useful delivery system for BHP, due largely to Medicaid managed care
plans existing infrastructure and low capitation rates).
129. See id. at 7 (noting that Medicaid reimbursement rates in most states are typically lower
that the providers receive from commercial reimbursement rates, resulting in questionable ability
of Medicaid to sustain a robust network of providers). Id. If BHP reimbursement rates closely
mirror Medicaid rates, the BHP may have a similar problem with attracting and sustaining
providers. BHP may need to enhance plan premiums in order to raise provider reimbursement
rates. Id.
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churn could occur for two reasons. First, by adding in another program along the
coverage continuum, there would be more potential transition points.130 Second,
the “affordability cliff” would be pushed to the 200% FPL level, the point at which
people would shift between the BHP and the Marketplace.131 A 2011 study
published in the New England Journal of Medicine concluded that a BHP would
likely reduce churning at the 138% FPL level but that overall churn would be
increased because of the new “affordability cliff” at 200% FPL.132
Other studies predict that overall churning would decrease if states had a BHP
and posit that churn might be less of a problem at the higher level, where people are
more likely to have some financial reserves and a higher likelihood of employersponsored coverage.133 Strategies to mitigate upper-level churn include variable
cost-sharing within the BHP (turning the affordability cliff into a slope) and
attention to coordination with provider networks.134 If the BHP is to serve as a
bridge between Medicaid and the Marketplace, it is crucially important to address
continuity of care at both transition points.
C. Would a BHP Enhance or Undermine the Viability of the Marketplace?
In a state that adopts the BHP, the ACA requires that all those eligible obtain
insurance coverage through that vehicle, thus removing many people from the
Marketplace.135 In terms of the expected impact on the Marketplace, questions

130. Graves et al., supra note at 126, at e44(3) (analyzing different data models that
demonstrate operating a health care system with Medicaid, BHP, and Marketplace plan would
increase churn). Under a three-program model 44% of all eligible adults remain eligible for their
initial program after one year, and 33% remain eligible for their initial program after two years.
Id. Conversely, under the baseline ACA model, 63% remain eligible for their initial program after
one year and 49% after two years. Id.
131. Id. at e44(2) (reporting that introducing a new BHP would likely lead to “coverage
disruption when moving above or below 200% of the poverty level”).
132. Id. at e44(3) (finding that under a BHP, “churning” would decrease at the 138% FPL,
however that decrease would be more than offset by the increase in churning at 200% FPL).
133. See Bachrach et al., supra note at 10, at 6 (stating that while any loss in continuity of
coverage is troubling, the loss can be better absorbed by those in higher income brackets because
they have increased access to resources and can better manage affordability cliffs); Ann Hwang, et
al., Creation of State Basic Health Program would lead to 4 Percent Fewer People Churning
Between Medicaid and Exchanges, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1314, 1317 (2012),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/6/1314.full.pdf+html (finding that the BHP would
reduce churn for low income adults).
134. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 5–6 (discussing churn and delivery system options
to reduce its impacts).
135. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18051(e)(2) (Supp. V 2012)
(stating that all eligible individuals will not be treated as a qualified individual eligible for
enrollment in a qualified health plan offered through a Marketplace and all eligible individuals
must enroll with the state-offered BHP).
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include not just the number of people involved but also their risk profile.136 As the
Kaiser report notes, “[t]he risk profile of the BHP eligible population will affect the
premiums in the [Marketplace], driving them up if the BHP population is healthier
than those remaining in the [Marketplace] or lowering the premiums if the BHP
population is sicker.”137 And the premium costs impact the level of funding for the
BHP.138 It all interrelates.
Studies estimate that the BHP would reduce the number of individuals
covered by Marketplace plans by roughly one third and the number of subsidyeligible individuals by half.139 Whether these individuals are healthier or sicker
than the general Marketplace pool might vary from state to state.140 A variety of
strategies have been proposed to mitigate a BHP’s impacts on the Marketplace,
some of which the federal regulations could address.141 The proposed regulations
seek specific comments on the contemplated approaches to risk adjustment and
reinsurance intended to account for the health status of BHP enrollees.142 For
example, the proposed rules describe a plan “to develop a risk adjustment factor to
include in the [forthcoming] BHP funding methodology rather than include BHP in
the individual market risk pool.”143 This is in contrast to an approach that would
include the BHP population in the individual market for purposes of risk
adjustment calculation.144 With any assessment, though, the number of enrollees is
critical.
As the Marketplaces open, there is increasing uncertainty about how many
people will sign up and the characteristics of the resulting risk pool, particularly in
states that have resisted ACA implementation and defaulted to federally run

136. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 8 (noting the BHP could reduce Marketplace
participation by as much as one third, potentially impacting risk profile of Marketplace enrollees
and weakening Marketplace viability).
137. Id.
138. See id. at 4 (stating that BHP federal funding is tied to enrollee premiums and cost-sharing
subsidies the enrollees would have qualified for had they decided to purchase insurance in the
Marketplace).
139. Id. at 8
140. See, e.g., Buettgens & Carroll, supra note 116, at 25 (finding that Washington’s BHP
population would be older than the same cohort in other states). See Day, supra note 117, at 3–5
(detailing the uncertainty of the insurance risk profile of individuals who would enroll in the BHP,
and explaining the benefits to the Marketplace and detriments to the BHP if the members of the
BHP are less healthy than individuals in the Marketplace).
141. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 9–10 (proposing various options, including those
that would combine the BHP and the individual market into a single risk pool, and options which
would “include the BHP in the risk adjustment and reinsurance systems used in the Exchange”).
142. Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,134 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 600).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Marketplaces.145 Will enrollees be young enough, healthy enough, male enough?
It is not clear how the various incentives and penalties will play out. In April 2013,
six months before the Marketplaces’ opening, a significant percentage of
Americans were either unsure if the ACA was even still on the books or sure that it
was not.146 With this level of misinformation, it will be a challenge to educate the
uninsured about the Marketplaces and subsidies and to get a sufficient number of
healthy people into these insurance pools. Even in states committed to robust
Marketplaces from the outset, expected enrollment numbers are a moving target
and may continue to be for some time.147 This current reality certainly complicates
BHP modeling.
One impetus for the interest in a BHP or a related option to address lowincome Marketplace shoppers is concern about the “bronze trap.”148 The concern is
that low-income people might buy a bronze-level health insurance plan (as opposed
to a silver, gold or platinum one) because of its comparatively low monthly
premium, and then not be able to pay the associated higher cost-sharing.149 The copays, co-insurance, and deductibles might then go unpaid, a problem for insurers
and providers. This “bronze trap” effect could be potentially significant. Going
forward, it will be important to track cost-sharing challenges related to the various
plan levels.
The structure of the federal tax subsidies to be offered on the Marketplaces
exacerbates this concern. The premium-support subsidies are pegged at the second145. See Sarah Kliff, For Obamacare, Four More (Uncertain) Years, WONKBLOG (Jan. 21,
2013) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/21/for-obamacare-four-moreuncertain-years/ (discussing possibility of lower enrollment rates in states, such as Oklahoma, that
are defaulting to the federally facilitated Marketplace and otherwise resisting the law, compared to
states running their own Marketplaces and otherwise supporting ACA implementation). More
than half the states are not running their own Marketplaces in the first year of the program, and are
instead defaulting to a federally facilitated Marketplace or a partnership model. See State
Decisions for Creating Health Insurance Marketplaces, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 28, 2013),
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-insurance-exchanges/#
146. See Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: April 2013, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 18-21,
2013), http://kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-april-2013/ (asking
American’s to describe their understanding of the current status of the health care law as one of
the following: “It is still the law of the land and is being implemented” (59%), “It has been
overturned by the Supreme Court and is no longer law” (7%), “It has been repealed by Congress
and is no longer law (12%), or “Don’t know/Refused” (23%)).
147. See generally Kelly Kennedy, States Predict More Insurance Customers, USA TODAY,
Aug. 20, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/08/09/19/health-care-lawuninsured-estimates-obama/2671489/ (discussing enrollment predictions in the state-run
Marketplaces).
148. Kelsey McCowan, How to Make Sure Health Reform Offers Affordable Insurance to all
Low
Income
Families,
SCHOLARS
STRATEGY
NETWORK
(Apr.
2013),
http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/ssn_basic_facts_heilman_ob_solving_h
ealthcre_reforms_affordability_problem_1.pdf.
149. See id. (explaining that the low premiums of bronze plans are desirable to families with
“modest incomes,” but might result in the family delaying or foregoing medical care because of
the associated high copayments and deductibles).
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lowest cost silver plan and may be used to purchase any of the plans (so that the
subsidy would go further if applied towards a bronze-level premium than if applied
to a platinum-level premium).150 The other type of subsidy is a sliding-scale costsharing subsidy available to Marketplace shoppers with incomes between 100%
and 250% FPL.151 This is in addition to the premium subsidy and is intended to
help defray the burden of co-pays, co-insurance and deductibles.152 This subsidy,
however, is available only for those enrolled in silver plans. It is not available to
someone who purchases a bronze plan.153 This is one of the many seemingly small
details of the ACA’s access provisions that can have a big practical impact.
D. How Would the BHP Federal Funding Compare to the
States’ Costs for the Program?
A motivating idea for this state option is that it would be operated using
federal dollars, so that a state would not be out many or any of its funds, and the
federal government would save money (compared to what it otherwise would have
spent).154 And, of course, that more low-income people would get better coverage.
To plan, particularly in times of strained state budgets, states need some certainty
about how the federal funding will be calculated, how any reconciliation would
work, and the timing of funding decisions.155 The Kaiser report provides an
extensive consideration of the variables with alternate scenarios.156 The funding
calculus is a moving target, partly because it is tied to the cost of premiums and
cost-sharing within the Marketplace;157 these numbers will become more solid as
150. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,382 (May 23, 2012)
(codified at 26 C.F.R §1.36B(b)(3)(B)(2012)); see also January Angeles, Making Health Care
More Affordable: The New Premium and Cost-Sharing Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES (Apr. 3, 2013), https://law.blackboard.umaryland.edu/bbcswebdav/pid-386529-dtcontent-rid1370516_1/courses/201309.96535.law.543D/CBPP%20Premium%20and%20Cost%20Sharing.pd
f (explaining that an individual may use their premium tax credit to purchase a more expensive
gold or platinum plan, but the individual will have to pay the difference between the premium
credit and the more expensive plan).
151. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(1)(B) (Supp. V 2012)).
152. BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ & ANNIE L. MACH, CONGRESS. RESEARCH SERV., R42663,
HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT (ACA), at 9 (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42663.pdf.
153. Id. at 26; see also 42 U.S.C. § 18071(c)(1)(B)(Supp. V 2012).
154. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 11–17 (explaining that while federal funding may
cover the entire BHP program, states are concerned that the federal funding available will be
insufficient, and states are attempting to “minimize the risk of inadequate federal funding”
through a variety of strategies and estimations about the program’s anticipated costs).
155. See id. at 11–15 (discussing the risks to states implementing the BHP, should federal
funding prove to be insufficient, specifically in regards to the mechanism for implementing annual
financing reconciliation.).
156. Id.
157. See id. at 13–15 (discussing how cost-sharing subsidies will be tied to factors that must be
adjusted for each enrollee, making it difficult to predict the cost of the premium tax credits and
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coverage begins. In addition, there are some statutory ambiguities,158 and a number
of regulatory choices to be made about how the funds are calculated, distributed,
and reconciled.159 The proposed rule sets forth a variety of factors to be used in
calculating the payments to participating states,160 with specific details on payment
to be issued later.161
Furthermore, the state’s costs to run the program are bound up with its
choices of the benefits covered, the reimbursement rates paid to providers, and the
level of cost-sharing imposed on beneficiaries.162 All of these are variable.163 The
Urban Institute modeling for Washington State concluded that a BHP “would likely
be feasible,” covering more people, at significantly lower cost to them, and with
payments to providers potentially one third higher than payments within
Medicaid.164 The report cautions, however, that there are several “sources of
uncertainty” related to the funding and that its modeling required a number of
budgetary assumptions.165
In states that had precursor programs, the administrative complexities of
setting up the program, contracting with plans, and coordinating across the
coverage continuum could certainly be less daunting. Program scaffolding, popular
recognition, and historic support, as are found with Washington’s precursor
program, could facilitate transition to the related BHP.166 The ease of such a
transition depends on a number of factors, including similarities of the two

cost-sharing subsidies, which equates to the amount of funding the states receive from the federal
government).
158. For example, the statute is not clear whether the state is to receive 100% or 95% of the
cost-sharing funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 18051((3)(a)(i) (Supp. V 2012) (“95 percent of the premium
tax credits . . . and the cost-sharing reductions”). The proposed rules interpret this as meaning
95% of the cost-sharing funds. Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,122, 59,133 (proposed
Sept. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 600.605(a)(2)) (“We have carefully considered this
issue, and have interpreted the statute to read that the payment amount equals 95 percent of the
cost-sharing reductions”).
159. See Basic Health Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 59122, 59133-59134 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 600.605(a)(2)) (discussing other proposed methods for determining
elements of BHP payment of federal funding to the States).
160. Id. at 59,133–34.
161. Id. at 59,123 (“ details on payment . . . will be issued separately.”).
162. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 16–17 (discussing state flexibility to set consumer
premiums and cost-sharing, as well as the provider network and reimbursement rates, giving them
some control over the revenue calculation that will impact costs).
163. See id. at 17.
164. Buettgens & Carroll, supra note 116, at 24–25.
165. See id. at 25 (explaining various programmatic uncertainties tied to enrollment and cost).
166. See id. at 6–7 ( suggesting that Washington could alter its Section 1115 waiver to continue
eligibility for certain populations and that this option “may not be difficult to administer”); see
also Angeles, supra note 150, at 8 (explaining how a state that already uses managed care
organizations to provided services to Medicaid beneficiaries could build on that infrastructure for
its BHP).
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programs, their size and characteristics of the coverage networks.167 The regulatory
delay, of course, undercuts the transitional value of precursor programs.168
States have a variety of potential options that can be viewed as both
placeholders pending BHP regulatory analysis, and also as alternatives in their own
right.169 They share many of the BHP’s goals and also its challenges. They also
share its uncertainty because guidance remained sketchy even as 2014
approached.170 The Administration has expressed a willingness to work with
interested states to “identify similar flexibilities in coverage systems.”171
One state working with the federal government on a placeholder option is
Minnesota.172 Minnesota’s legislature decided to continue its precursor program of
state-subsidized insurance as a vehicle for the BHP.173 Thus, MinnesotaCare is
expected to continue with state funding (and matching federal funding tied to
Medicaid) through 2014.174 At that point, the program is expected to transition to a
167. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 6–7 (explaining that while states may benefit from
utilizing an already established Medicaid managed care program as a “delivery system” for the
BHP, often Medicaid plans have narrower networks of providers, and the lower reimbursement
rate for Medicaid services may not attract and sustain “robust provider networks” for the BHP).
168. See id. at 8 (explaining the financial risk that states run if they build a BHP on a noncapitated delivery model before receiving final federal guidance); Paul Demko, State Rolls Out
MinnesotaCare
2.0,
POLITICS
IN
MINN.
(June
19,
2013),
available
at
http://politicsinminnesota.com/2013/06/state-rolls-out-minnesotacare-2-0/ (discussing how the
state is attempting to bring its established MinnesotaCare plan in line with the federal guidelines,
even though the final rules for the BHP will not be issued until 2015).
169. See infra notes 174–177 and accompanying text (discussing the decision by Minnesota to
continue funding its MinnesotaCare program as a placeholder until the BHP plans are federally
funded in 2015).
170. See Demko, supra note 168 (discussing Minnesota’s decision to continue funding their
state program MinnesotaCare until federal funding is available in 2015, while making reforms to
the plan in “anticipation of what are likely BHP requirements”).
171. Medicaid and CHIP FAQs: The Basic Health Program, supra note 98; see also
Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS. at 6–7 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources
/Files/Downloads/exchanges-faqs-12-10-2012.pdf (explaining the government’s willingness to
work with states who wish to implement a Marketplace “bridge” plan offered by a managed care
organization that also offers a state Medicaid plan). These “bridge” plans would only be available
to a limited population that is transitioning from Medicaid/CHIP to private insurance. Frequently
Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. at 6–7 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/
Files/Downloads/exchanges-faqs-12-10-2012.pdf.
172. See M.S.A § 256L.02(5)) (seeking “federal approval to implement MinnesotaCare” as a
BHP); see also Catharine Richert, Affordable Care Act Has Unique Proving Ground in
Minnesota, MINN. PUB. RADIO (July 9, 2013), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web
/2013/07/09/health/affordable-care-act-minnesota-proving-ground (discussing the state of
Minnesota’s decision to fund MinnesotaCare, the state’s basic health program, until 2015 when
federal funding will become available).
173. See Richert, supra note 172 (discussing Minnesota’s legislature decision to continue fund
MinnesotaCare until BHP funding becomes available in 2015).
174. Id.; see also MINN. HUMAN SERVS., 2014–15 BIENNIAL BUDGET; ACA: NEW
MINNESOTACARE-NEW, last accessed Oct. 18, 2013, available at http://mn.gov/dhs/images/CI-
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BHP, with the broader federal funding.175 This transition will be a helpful model
for other interested states.
The Administration specifically indicated that a “bridge option” might gain
approval.176 This idea can be viewed as expanding Medicaid upwards into the
Marketplace territory.177 A state could designate one or more of its Medicaid
managed care plans as QHPs at the silver coverage level on the Marketplace.178
These would be available “on a limited-enrollment basis to certain populations.”179
A “narrow bridge” would apply to individuals transitioning from Medicaid or
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) coverage to the Marketplace.180 They
would be eligible for the QHP bridge plan that would presumably include the same
provider network and low cost-sharing obligations.181 In addition, in low-income
families where only some members (likely young children or pregnant women)
qualified for Medicaid or CHIP, this arrangement possibly could be designed to
allow the entire family to be on the same insurance plan.182
This sort of “one card option”183 ideally would promote continuity of
coverage and its attendant health benefits. It is unclear how this type of bridge
option would impact the rest of a state’s Marketplace. For example, the ACA’s
Marketplace framework assumes that all the plans offered are available to all
eligible shoppers, and this model would set aside a low-cost plan as available only

95_HC75_ACA_New_MinnesotaCare_Demo_Waiver.pdf; see also Demko, supra note 168
(discussing that MinnesotaCare costs are currently shared almost evenly between state and federal
funding, however in 2015 the federal government will likely pay 85% of the cost).
175. Richert, supra note 172.
176. See Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra
note 171, at 6 (detailing the terms under which a Marketplace “may allow an issuer . . . to offer a
qualified health plan as a Medicaid bridge plan”).
177. See id. (explaining that an individual can retain many qualities of his or her Medicaid
coverage after transitioning into the Marketplace).
178. Id. at 6–7 (“In general, an Exchange may allow an issuer with a state Medicaid managed
care organization contract to offer a qualified health plan as a Medicaid bridge plan . . . ”).
179. Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra note
171, at 6.
180. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 19 (discussing early versions of this potential option
and related state proposals).
181. Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra note
171; Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 19.
182. Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra note
171, at 6.
183. Id.
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to some.184 Would that skew the available subsidies (which are pegged to the
second least expensive plan in the silver category)?185
Under some scenarios, this limited-enrollment QHP could potentially be
expanded to become a “broad bridge” for all of those ineligible for Medicaid,
otherwise eligible for subsidized coverage, and with incomes below 200% FPL.186
This is, of course, the BHP population.187 The coverage structure and funding
model would be different than under a BHP, though it would address similar
concerns.188
One idea emerging as an option to Medicaid expansion evinces the
Administration’s willingness to consider a variety of coverage models in the wake
of the Supreme Court’s decision that made the Medicaid expansion optional.189 In
states where lawmakers are resistant to expanding Medicaid, one possible approach
that has been forwarded by a few of those states is a “premium assistance”
model.190 This would use federal Medicaid expansion money (the federal matching
funds for newly eligible Medicaid enrollees that begin at full cost in 2014 and then
ratchet down to 90% in 2020 and beyond) to buy coverage on the Marketplace for
those with incomes between 100% FPL and 138% FPL.191 In some ways this
184. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 19 (explaining that former Medicaid beneficiaries
could receive unique benefits in the Marketplace); see Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges,
Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra note 173, at 11 (explaining that when enrolling in a
federally-facilitated Marketplace, consumers will be presented with all QHPs that they are eligible
for, not the QHPs that might be best for them in particular).
185. Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 19 (explaining that bridge plan premiums would not
factor into the benchmark plan’s value, and since tax subsidies are based on the benchmark plan’s
value, they would disproportionately favor bridge plan enrollees).
186. California is one of the states that actively pursued a bridge option. See, e.g., Bridge
Plan: A Strategy to Promote Continuity of Care & Affordability Through Contracts with Medi-Cal
Managed Care Plans, COVERED CAL. 1 (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.healthexchange.ca.gov/	
  
BoardMeetings/Documents/January17_2013/VI._B._Affordability-Continuity_of_Care_Options_
BRB.pdf (discussing legislation authorizing establishment of limited-enrollment QHPs, the
impacts in California of a narrow and a broad bridge, and the unresolved questions).
187. See Bachrach et al., supra note 10, at 1 (explaining that BHPs apply to those whose
income is between 139% and 200% of the FPL).
188. Compare id. (noting that the BHP “allows states to use federal tax subsidy dollars to offer
subsidized coverage for individuals” to promote “continuity among plans and providers as . . .
income fluctuates above and below Medicaid levels.”) with Frequently Asked Questions on
Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid, supra note 173, at 6 (stating that bridges treat
Medicaid managed care plans as private QHPs, and they are “intended to promote continuity of
coverage between Medicaid or CHIP and the Exchange.”).
189. Julie Piotrowski, Health Policy Brief: Premium Assistance in Medicaid, HEALTH AFF. 1
(June 6, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_94.pdf
(explaining that although states now have the option not to expand Medicaid, the potential for
negative consequences is encouraging them to consider alternatives such as the premium
assistance model). This option is a possibility because the Marketplace subsidies begin at 100%
FPL rather than the Medicaid level of 138%. As discussed at supra note 62, this subsidy level
might be a drafting error. Supra, note 62 and accompanying text.
190. Piotrowski, supra note 189, at 1.
191. See id. at 2.
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“Private Option” Medicaid model can be viewed as expanding the Marketplace
down into Medicaid.192 The Arkansas legislature endorsed this approach and the
state pursued it with federal regulators under a possible demonstration waiver.193
Proponents suggest that it would allow more people to be covered by insurance as
compared to a non-expansion, support the private insurance market, and reduce
churn as compared to a standard Medicaid expansion.194
One big hurdle for this premium assistance idea is cost, as private insurance is
generally substantially more expensive than Medicaid coverage,195 and a state
interested in this approach must show that it is cost-effective compared to enrolling
the population in Medicaid.196 The Congressional Budget Office determined that
covering each beneficiary through a Marketplace plan would, on average, be about
50% more expensive compared to Medicaid coverage.197 Arkansas estimates that
in its state the cost differential would be much less, closer to 13% or 14%.198
Coverage through the Marketplace plans would need to be consistent with
Medicaid requirements, including as to scope of benefits and cost-sharing
restrictions, among other concerns.199 This Medicaid premium assistance idea is
not the BHP, and not really a BHP alternative or placeholder. It does, however,
reinforce the potential role of state innovation and the importance of attention to
options for low income people along the coverage continuum.

192. See id. at 2, 3 (noting that the premium approach utilizes funds traditionally appropriated
for Medicaid to purchase private insurance for people traditionally covered by Medicaid).
193. Id. at 6 (“State health officials in Arkansas are aiming to submit their premium assistance
waiver request in June . . .”); see also ARK. DEP’T HUMAN SERV., ARKANSAS DRAFT 1115
WAIVER FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (2013), https://www.medicaid.state.ar.us/Download/general/
comment/InitialHCIWApp.doc (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (indicating the potential basis for the
waiver).
194. See Piotrowski, supra note 189, at 2, 4–5 (explaining that full state implementation of
Medicaid would have covered 16 million more people, and since states no longer have to expand
Medicaid, the premium approach may fill that gap in states that choose not to expand Medicaid;
additionally, the premium approach may remove “any potential coverage gaps created when
someone’s income rises and they become ineligible for Medicaid.”).
195. See id. at 4 (reporting that “[t]he Congressional Budget Office determined that covering
each recipient through an exchange will, on average, cost the federal government an additional
$9,000 per year versus $6,000 through the regular Medicaid delivery system.”).
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 3 (explaining that HHS requires premium plans to be comparable to Medicaid in
terms of benefits and cost-sharing).
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V. CONCLUSION
Effectively implementing the ACA’s access provisions will be a challenging,
on-going process, with state action at the forefront.200 As the expansion states work
towards near universal coverage, they should pay close attention to the practical
challenges faced by those in the income bands around the transition from Medicaid
to Marketplace.201 It is in this transition, this gap, that the benefits of health care
continuity will face key affordability and network challenges.202
If the ACA’s goal is not merely access to health insurance, but more broadly
access to health care, and more broadly still, good health, then states need to mind
the gap. As people, by virtue of income or family composition changes, move from
one insurance platform to another, they need sure footing.203 The ACA’s BHP
might be able to provide that footing.204 We will not know, though, until the
federal regulations take shape and more solid answers emerge as to the program’s
possible impacts on low-income people, on the Marketplaces, and on state budgets.
Whether or not many states ultimately pursue a BHP, consideration of this
option draws attention to insurance affordability and care continuity challenges.
These challenges are particularly acute for those with low incomes, but they
fundamentally animate all aspects of the ACA with its goals of increasing
coverage, reducing costs, and improving quality across the coverage continuum as
broadly conceived.205

200. See supra Part III (explaining that states will be the pioneers in implementing and
addressing problems with the ACA).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 70–76 (explaining the disruptive churn and cost
variations faced by those who fluctuate between Medicaid and private insurance).
202. See supra notes 71–73, 76 (explaining the “affordability cliff” and potential network
discontinuity between Medicaid and Marketplace plans).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 123–25 (detailing the prevalence and effects of
churn).
204. See supra Part IV (assessing the potential for BHPs to promote affordability and
continuity while reducing churn).
205. See supra Part I (summarizing the goals of the ACA).

